Federal Census policy breaks Vermont’s democracy — state lawmakers can fix it
Vermont’s redistricting data was once again skewed after the 2020 Census; the state needs to take action to fix the issue for 2030
by Aleks Kajstura, September 24, 2025
Everyone in Vermont is supposed to have an equal voice in their government’s decisions, but an outdated and misguided Census Bureau policy that counts incarcerated people in the wrong place gives a few residents of the state a megaphone. It is a problem known as prison gerrymandering, and Vermont lawmakers can fix it.
Vermont blindly follows outdated bureaucratic federal policy
Every ten years, when the Census Bureau conducts its official tally of the nation’s population, it incorrectly counts incarcerated people as residents of prison cells rather than in their home communities. This is despite the fact that they usually are not from the prison town, have no family or social ties there, likely won’t stay there for long, and state residence law says they’re not residents there. Furthermore, Vermont residents don’t lose the right to vote while incarcerated, and are required to vote by absentee ballot at their home address. So when state officials then use Census data in the legislative redistricting process, incarcerated people are counted toward the constituent total of one district, but vote for representatives in another.
Using Census data to draw legislative districts creates a mismatch between Census data and Vermont law, inadvertently inflating the populations of districts that contain prions — in violation of constitutional principles of equal representation. This gives residents of state legislative districts that contain correctional facilities a particularly loud voice in government, allowing them to have an outsized influence on debates about school funding, housing, medical care, and more, at the expense of nearly every other person in the state.
To ensure equal representation, states across the country have taken steps to fix this problem that the Census Bureau created. But, Vermont is one of the remaining states still suffering from this “prison gerrymandering.” While the 2030 Census count is still years away, Vermont needs to act now to avoid prison gerrymandering the next time it redraws its districts.
Prison gerrymandering puts one Vermont district above all others
In Vermont, residents of six House of Representatives districts are given a louder voice in government as a result of prison gerrymandering.
The six prison-gerrymandered House of Representatives districts in Vermont:
| District | Notable facilities | Percent of the district that is incarcerated |
|---|---|---|
| Orleans-2 | Northern State Correctional Facility | 8.1% |
| Franklin-3 | Northwest State Correctional Facility | 4.3% |
| Windsor-3 | Southern State Correctional Facility | 3.4% |
| Rutland-7 | Marble Valley Regional Correctional Facility | 2.42% |
| Chittenden-11 | Chittenden Regional Correctional Facility | 2.3% |
| Caledonia-Essex | Northeast Correctional Complex | 1.3% |
Most notably, the state counted people at the Northern State Correctional Facility as if they were residents of District Orleans-2. Those 360 people make up over 8% of the district’s population.
That means that just 92 residents of the Orleans-2 District have as much political clout as 100 residents in a typical district. That imbalance in representation comes from the state choosing to redistrict based on Census numbers that don’t match the reality of where people live.
The Census counted people incarcerated in those facilities as if they were residents of the facility location, even though state correctional facilities regularly contain people who are incarcerated far from home, have no ties to the communities where the facilities are located, and are moved regularly between facilities for administrative convenience. Simply put, being incarcerated in a specific facility doesn’t make someone a resident of the surrounding district.
Prison gerrymandering disproportionately harms Vermont’s Black and Native residents
Prison gerrymandering reduces the political power of nearly all Vermont residents by allowing a handful of districts with large correctional facilities to claim residents from all over the state. It particularly harms Black and Native people and enshrines the racial inequities of mass incarceration into the state’s legislative districts.
In Vermont, like across the country, mass incarceration has a disproportionate impact along racial lines. In Vermont, Black and Native American residents are incarcerated at significantly higher rates and, therefore, are counted in the wrong place more often than Vermont’s white residents.
Black residents make up just over 1% of the state population, but a whopping 10% of people in prisons. Native residents make up less than a quarter of one percent of the State’s population, but 2% of people in prisons.
The racial impact of prison gerrymandering is so strong that, for example, 42% of Black people, and 28% of Native Americans counted in State House Orleans-2 were actually behind bars in the Northern State Correctional Facility, rather than living in the community. And this district isn’t alone. For example, in Franklin-3, 31% Black people and 29% of Native Americans were counted at the Northwest State Correctional Facility, and in the Caledonia Essex District, 26% of Native Americans were counted at the Northeast Correctional Complex.
Vermont’s disproportionate incarceration of Black and Native residents, combined with the Census Bureau counting incarcerated people as if they live at the facility location, means the state is effectively silencing the voices of a large portion of the state’s Black and Native residents.
Vermont law says a prison cell is not a residence. Census Bureau policy disagrees
Not only does the Census Bureau’s redistricting data cause prison gerrymandering, it also doesn’t comply with Vermont’s law. The state’s statutes explicitly state that being incarcerated doesn’t change a person’s residence:
“A person shall not gain or lose a residence solely by reason of presence or absence… while confined in a prison or correctional institution.”
Vermont Annotated Statutes, Title 17, S2122(a).
That is why incarcerated people in Vermont are required to vote by absentee ballot at their home address.1
Instead of following state law, though, the Census Bureau follows its own “residence rule” to choose where to count incarcerated people — where they “live and sleep most of the time.” But it doesn’t even follow this rule properly when it comes to counting incarcerated people.
The Census Bureau counts incarcerated people at the location of the facility where they happen to be held on Census Day under the mistaken belief that that is where incarcerated people “live and sleep most of the time.” The facts, however, do not support its interpretation of its own definition of residence. It is well-established that in the modern era of mass incarceration, incarcerated people do not “live and sleep most of the time” at the facility where they are held on any given day (including Census Day). Nationally, 75% of people serve time in more than one prison facility, and 12% of people serve time in at least five facilities before returning home.
Nationally, state and local governments are addressing the problem, but Vermont is lagging behind
Over the course of the last few decades, a growing number of states and over 200 local governments have taken action on their own to fix this problem. Nearly half of the US population now lives in a place that corrects redistricting data they receive from the Census to avoid prison gerrymandering.
States that have ended prison gerrymandering on their own include deep “blue” states like California, “purple” states like Maine and Pennsylvania, and deep “red” states like Montana — where prison gerrymandering-reform legislation received wide bipartisan support. But Vermont is falling behind and letting the state’s democracy be skewed by an outdated federal system.
Vermont needs to take action now
Adjusting redistricting data to avoid prison gerrymandering is now a well-tested strategy with a proven track record. In fact, the bipartisan National Conference of State Legislatures called this effort “the fastest-growing trend in redistricting.” Vermont can now confidently pass legislation to count incarcerated people at home for redistricting purposes. Other states have already been successful in these efforts, paving the way for Vermont. And the state would have the benefit of refining its approach based on lessons learned by states that have gone through the process before. And it is easier than ever for states to act; even the Census Bureau is starting to acknowledge the problem and help.
2030 may seem far away, but other states have learned that the earlier that reforms are put in place, the less expensive, easier to produce, and more accurate the final redistricting data becomes. Every state has a different legislative approach to ending prison gerrymandering, but as a practical matter, this model bill, prepared by a coalition of civil rights, voting rights, and criminal justice organizations, is a great place to start. It provides clear guidance on how this data should be collected, by whom, and how it will be used for the redistricting process.
The Census Bureau is unlikely to change its policies about how to count incarcerated people in time for the 2030 Census, meaning that unless Vermont acts quickly, the state will once again be driven into prison-gerrymandering its legislative districts.
Vermont needs to end prison gerrymandering now.
About the Data
Correctional Facility Populations: To calculate the percentage of each district’s population that was in correctional facilities, we used the redistricting data (PL 94-171) from the 2020 Census. Table P1 provides the total population for each Census block and Table P5 provides the number of incarcerated people for each Census Block. Notably, this approach includes people in all kinds of correctional facilities, including state prisons, federal prisons, private prisons, local jails, halfway houses, etc.
Identifying specific facilities: Table P5 provides the population of correctional facilities without distinguishing between state, federal, or private facilities and it is published for each Census block. Census blocks do not necessarily translate directly to facilities, as some facilities are counted in multiple blocks and some blocks contain multiple facilities. To aid redistricting officials and advocates with using this data, the Prison Policy Initiative maintains a Facility Locator Tool that contains annotations of most of the Census blocks in the country that contain correctional facilities. These annotations rely on publicly-available data to identify facility names and types in each of these blocks.
How this report quantifies prison gerrymandering compared to other analyses: There are a few ways to calculate the impact of prison gerrymandering, so other researchers may have used slightly different approaches that generate slightly different numbers for the same general problem. For example, some analyses only focus on prisons and exclude jail populations. That choice makes sense when looking at state-level policies and state districts because people in jails are very likely to also live in the legislative district where the jail is located. However, for this analysis, we included jails as well as state correctional facilities because Vermont has a unified prison and jail system. Still other approaches, such as that taken by the Redistricting Data Hub, are based on estimates of incarcerated people’s home addresses. That approach adds an additional level of precision for counting people held in state facilities because it seeks to not only address where these people were counted incorrectly — which accounts for the bulk of prison gerrymandering’s population distortion — but to also estimate where they should have been counted. Unfortunately, this approach isn’t able to reflect where people in federal facilities, most jails, and private facilities are from. And so, for simplicity, this report doesn’t use that approach.
Each of these approaches has its own merits, and none are universally better than others; they all highlight different aspects of how prison gerrymandering skews population numbers, and each has its own use. The complexities inherent in the current patchwork approach to identifying and solving prison gerrymandering point to the need for the Census Bureau to count incarcerated people at home in the first place in order to provide a comprehensive solution to prison gerrymandering.
Correctional facility populations in Vermont House of Representatives Districts, 2020 Census
| State House District | Number of members | 2020 Census Total Population | 2020 Census Incarcerated Population | Percent of the District that is Incarcerated | Official District Population Deviation | Actual Deviation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ADD-1 | 2 | 8239 | 0 | 0% | -3.91% | -3.91% |
| ADD-2 | 1 | 4329 | 0 | 0% | 0.98% | 0.98% |
| ADD-3 | 2 | 8144 | 0 | 0% | -5.02% | -5.02% |
| ADD-4 | 2 | 8940 | 0 | 0% | 4.27% | 4.27% |
| ADD-5 | 1 | 4147 | 0 | 0% | -3.27% | -3.27% |
| ADD-RUT | 1 | 4184 | 0 | 0% | -2.40% | -2.40% |
| BEN-1 | 1 | 4413 | 0 | 0% | 2.94% | 2.94% |
| BEN-2 | 2 | 8078 | 0 | 0% | -5.78% | -5.78% |
| BEN-3 | 1 | 4029 | 0 | 0% | -6.02% | -6.02% |
| BEN-4 | 2 | 7962 | 0 | 0% | -7.14% | -7.14% |
| BEN-5 | 2 | 8144 | 0 | 0% | -5.02% | -5.02% |
| BEN-RUT | 1 | 4335 | 0 | 0% | 1.12% | 1.12% |
| CAL-1 | 1 | 4096 | 0 | 0% | -4.46% | -4.46% |
| CAL-2 | 1 | 4084 | 0 | 0% | -4.74% | -4.74% |
| CAL-3 | 2 | 8429 | 0 | 0% | -1.69% | -1.69% |
| CAL-ESX | 2 | 9080 | 122 | 1.34% | 5.90% | 4.56% |
| CAL-WAS | 1 | 4493 | 0 | 0% | 4.81% | 4.81% |
| CHI-1 | 1 | 4167 | 0 | 0% | -2.80% | -2.80% |
| CHI-10 | 1 | 4170 | 0 | 0% | -2.73% | -2.73% |
| CHI-11 | 1 | 4066 | 94 | 2.31% | -5.16% | -7.47% |
| CHI-12 | 1 | 4627 | 0 | 0% | 7.93% | 7.93% |
| CHI-13 | 2 | 7982 | 0 | 0% | -6.90% | -6.90% |
| CHI-14 | 2 | 8185 | 0 | 0% | -4.54% | -4.54% |
| CHI-15 | 2 | 8172 | 0 | 0% | -4.69% | -4.69% |
| CHI-16 | 2 | 8044 | 0 | 0% | -6.18% | -6.18% |
| CHI-17 | 1 | 4045 | 0 | 0% | -5.65% | -5.65% |
| CHI-18 | 2 | 8315 | 0 | 0% | -3.02% | -3.02% |
| CHI-19 | 2 | 8707 | 0 | 0% | 1.55% | 1.55% |
| CHI-2 | 2 | 9293 | 0 | 0% | 8.39% | 8.39% |
| CHI-20 | 2 | 8817 | 0 | 0% | 2.83% | 2.83% |
| CHI-21 | 2 | 7997 | 0 | 0% | -6.73% | -6.73% |
| CHI-22 | 2 | 9133 | 0 | 0% | 6.52% | 6.52% |
| CHI-23 | 2 | 8687 | 0 | 0% | 1.32% | 1.32% |
| CHI-24 | 1 | 4274 | 0 | 0% | -0.30% | -0.30% |
| CHI-25 | 1 | 4197 | 0 | 0% | -2.10% | -2.10% |
| CHI-3 | 2 | 8233 | 0 | 0% | -3.98% | -3.98% |
| CHI-4 | 1 | 4614 | 0 | 0% | 7.63% | 7.63% |
| CHI-5 | 1 | 3996 | 0 | 0% | -6.79% | -6.79% |
| CHI-6 | 1 | 4261 | 0 | 0% | -0.61% | -0.61% |
| CHI-7 | 1 | 4250 | 0 | 0% | -0.86% | -0.86% |
| CHI-8 | 1 | 4230 | 0 | 0% | -1.33% | -1.33% |
| CHI-9 | 1 | 4009 | 0 | 0% | -6.48% | -6.48% |
| CHI-FRA | 2 | 8116 | 0 | 0% | -5.34% | -5.34% |
| ESX-CAL | 1 | 4112 | 0 | 0% | -4.08% | -4.08% |
| ESX-ORL | 1 | 4609 | 0 | 0% | 7.51% | 7.51% |
| FRA-1 | 2 | 8949 | 0 | 0% | 4.37% | 4.37% |
| FRA-2 | 1 | 4612 | 198 | 4.29% | 7.58% | 3.29% |
| FRA-3 | 1 | 4622 | 0 | 0% | 7.81% | 7.81% |
| FRA-4 | 2 | 8837 | 0 | 0% | 3.07% | 3.07% |
| FRA-5 | 2 | 8728 | 0 | 0% | 1.80% | 1.80% |
| FRA-6 | 1 | 4663 | 0 | 0% | 8.77% | 8.77% |
| FRA-7 | 1 | 3994 | 0 | 0% | -6.83% | -6.83% |
| FRA-8 | 1 | 4631 | 0 | 0% | 8.02% | 8.02% |
| GI-CHI | 2 | 8675 | 0 | 0% | 1.18% | 1.18% |
| LAM-1 | 1 | 4551 | 0 | 0% | 6.16% | 6.16% |
| LAM-2 | 2 | 8539 | 0 | 0% | -0.41% | -0.41% |
| LAM-3 | 1 | 4525 | 0 | 0% | 5.55% | 5.55% |
| LAM-WAS | 2 | 8884 | 0 | 0% | 3.62% | 3.62% |
| ORA-1 | 1 | 4207 | 0 | 0% | -1.87% | -1.87% |
| ORA-2 | 1 | 4399 | 0 | 0% | 2.61% | 2.61% |
| ORA-3 | 1 | 4201 | 0 | 0% | -2.01% | -2.01% |
| ORA-CAL | 1 | 4476 | 0 | 0% | 4.41% | 4.41% |
| ORA‑WAS‑ADD | 2 | 8204 | 0 | 0% | -4.32% | -4.32% |
| ORL-1 | 1 | 4579 | 0 | 0% | 6.81% | 6.81% |
| ORL-2 | 1 | 4455 | 360 | 8.08% | 3.92% | -4.16% |
| ORL-3 | 1 | 4271 | 0 | 0% | -0.37% | -0.37% |
| ORL-4 | 1 | 4244 | 0 | 0% | -1.00% | -1.00% |
| ORL-LAM | 2 | 8891 | 0 | 0% | 3.70% | 3.70% |
| RUT-1 | 1 | 4047 | 0 | 0% | -5.60% | -5.60% |
| RUT-10 | 1 | 3949 | 0 | 0% | -7.88% | -7.88% |
| RUT-11 | 1 | 4297 | 0 | 0% | 0.23% | 0.23% |
| RUT-2 | 2 | 9056 | 0 | 0% | 5.62% | 5.62% |
| RUT-3 | 1 | 4458 | 0 | 0% | 3.99% | 3.99% |
| RUT-4 | 1 | 4500 | 0 | 0% | 4.97% | 4.97% |
| RUT-5 | 1 | 4110 | 0 | 0% | -4.13% | -4.13% |
| RUT-6 | 1 | 4275 | 14 | 0.33% | -0.28% | -0.61% |
| RUT-7 | 1 | 4545 | 110 | 2.42% | 6.02% | 3.60% |
| RUT-8 | 1 | 4625 | 0 | 0% | 7.88% | 7.88% |
| RUT-9 | 1 | 4129 | 0 | 0% | -3.69% | -3.69% |
| RUT-BEN | 1 | 4024 | 0 | 0% | -6.13% | -6.13% |
| RUT-WDR | 1 | 4653 | 0 | 0% | 8.54% | 8.54% |
| WAS-1 | 2 | 8767 | 0 | 0% | 2.25% | 2.25% |
| WAS-2 | 2 | 8351 | 0 | 0% | -2.60% | -2.60% |
| WAS-3 | 2 | 8491 | 9 | 0.11% | -0.97% | -1.07% |
| WAS-4 | 2 | 8074 | 0 | 0% | -5.83% | -5.83% |
| WAS-5 | 1 | 4377 | 0 | 0% | 2.10% | 2.10% |
| WAS-6 | 1 | 4480 | 0 | 0% | 4.50% | 4.50% |
| WAS-CHI | 2 | 8595 | 0 | 0% | 0.24% | 0.24% |
| WAS-ORA | 2 | 8470 | 0 | 0% | -1.21% | -1.21% |
| WDH-1 | 1 | 4312 | 0 | 0% | 0.58% | 0.58% |
| WDH-2 | 1 | 4118 | 0 | 0% | -3.94% | -3.94% |
| WDH-3 | 2 | 8388 | 0 | 0% | -2.17% | -2.17% |
| WDH-4 | 1 | 4482 | 0 | 0% | 4.55% | 4.55% |
| WDH-5 | 1 | 4658 | 0 | 0% | 8.65% | 8.65% |
| WDH-6 | 1 | 4370 | 0 | 0% | 1.94% | 1.94% |
| WDH-7 | 1 | 4054 | 0 | 0% | -5.44% | -5.44% |
| WDH-8 | 1 | 4079 | 0 | 0% | -4.85% | -4.85% |
| WDH-9 | 1 | 4051 | 0 | 0% | -5.51% | -5.51% |
| WDH‑WDR‑BEN | 1 | 4292 | 0 | 0% | 0.12% | 0.12% |
| WDR-1 | 2 | 8349 | 0 | 0% | -2.62% | -2.62% |
| WDR-2 | 1 | 4463 | 0 | 0% | 4.11% | 4.11% |
| WDR-3 | 2 | 9062 | 312 | 3.44% | 5.69% | 2.25% |
| WDR-4 | 1 | 4489 | 0 | 0% | 4.71% | 4.71% |
| WDR-5 | 1 | 4333 | 0 | 0% | 1.07% | 1.07% |
| WDR-6 | 2 | 9008 | 0 | 0% | 5.06% | 5.06% |
| WDR-ADD | 1 | 4118 | 0 | 0% | -3.94% | -3.94% |
| WDR‑ORA‑1 | 1 | 4087 | 0 | 0% | -4.67% | -4.67% |
| WDR‑ORA‑2 | 2 | 9041 | 0 | 0% | 5.45% | 5.45% |
| WDR‑WDH | 1 | 4479 | 0 | 0% | 4.48% | 4.48% |
Table notes
- Number of members
- Vermont has multi-member districts.
- 2020 Census Total Population
- Total population reported for all blocks in the district (as redistricted in 2022). Block populations reported for the 2020 Census in the PL 94-171 redistricting summary files Table P1.
- 2020 Census Incarcerated Population
- Total incarcerated population reported in all blocks in the district (as redistricted in 2022), based on the incarcerated population in group quarters reported for the 2020 Census in the PL 94-171 redistricting summary files Table P5.
- Percent of the District that is Incarcerated
- This is the number of incarcerated people counted in the district divided by the total population of the district.
- Official District Population Deviation
- The difference from the ideal district size based on Census data.
- Actual Deviation
- The difference from the ideal district size, accounting for the impact of prison gerrymandering and the intended population deviation based on Census data.
Footnotes
-
The Sentencing Project’s report, Voting From Prison: Lessons from Maine and Vermont, provides a detailed explanation of the voting process for incarcerated Vermonters.
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