Louisiana’s redistricting data was once again skewed after the 2020 Census; the state needs to take action to fix the issue for 2030.

by Aleks Kajstura, May 28, 2025

Everyone in Louisiana is supposed to have an equal voice in their government’s decisions, but an outdated and misguided Census Bureau policy that counts incarcerated people in the wrong place gives a few residents of the state a megaphone. It is a problem known as prison gerrymandering, and Louisiana lawmakers can fix it.

Louisiana blindly follows an outdated bureaucratic federal policy

Every ten years, when the Census Bureau conducts its official tally of the nation’s population, it incorrectly counts incarcerated people as residents of prison cells rather than in their home communities. This is despite the fact that they usually are not from the prison town, have no family or social ties there, likely won’t stay there for long, and state law1 says they’re not residents there. When state officials then use that incorrect Census data in the legislative redistricting process, they inadvertently inflate the populations of those areas — in violation of constitutional principles of equal representation. This gives residents of state legislative districts that contain correctional facilities a particularly loud voice in government, allowing them to have an outsized influence on debates about election laws, education, unemployment, gun laws, and more, at the expense of nearly every other person in the state.

That is why states across the country have taken steps to fix the problem that the Census Bureau created. But, Louisiana is one of the remaining states still suffering from this “prison gerrymandering.”

The legislative districts currently in place were deemed unconstitutional in 2024 for diluting representation for Black people, and prison gerrymandering makes the situation even worse than assumed by the court. This report analyzes the districts as drawn in 2022 since no new maps have been put in place, and it’s unclear whether they will be redrawn before the 2027 elections.

Louisiana needs to act now to avoid prison gerrymandering during the 2030 redistricting cycle — as well as the current court-ordered process.

Prison gerrymandering significantly distorts Louisiana’s state legislative districts

In Louisiana, there are three state House districts — districts 22, 18, and 32 — that powerfully illustrate how prisons distort district populations and give some residents a louder voice in government as a result of prison gerrymandering.

In District 22, for example, correctional facilities make up roughly 12% of the population. That means that just 88 residents of that district have as much political clout as 100 residents in any other district. That imbalance in representation comes from the state choosing to redistrict based on Census numbers that don’t match the reality of where people live. And Louisiana’s huge prison populations — only El Salvador incarcerates people at a higher rate — leave it especially vulnerable to the Census Bureau’s flawed prison counts.

Three most prison-gerrymandered State House Districts in Louisiana:

These three districts are the most prison-gerrymandered in Louisiana. For details on all districts, see the Appendix
State House District District Location Facilities in the district include Percent of the district that is incarcerated
District 22 Grant, and parts of La Salle, and Natchitoches Parishes Federal Correctional Complex Pollock, LaSalle Detention Facility, LaSalle Correctional Center, Natchitoches Detention Center 11.7%
District 18 Pointe Coupee, West Feliciana, and parts of Iberville, and West Baton Rouge Louisiana State Penitentiary 11.4%
District 32 Allen, and parts of Beauregard, Calcasieu, and Jefferson Davis Parishes Oakdale Federal Correctional Complex, Allen Correctional Center, Southwest Workforce Development Transitional Work Program 8.3%

These three districts are the most prison-gerrymandered state legislative districts in Louisiana. Large chunks of their population are made up of prisons that contain people from other parts of the state (or other states), instead of local residents. State facilities regularly contain people who are incarcerated far from home, have no ties to the communities where the facilities are located, and are moved regularly between facilities for administrative convenience.

Even worse, the largest facilities in Districts 22 and 32 don’t contain Louisiana residents — they are used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to hold people from all over the country. Only about 1% of the Bureau of Prisons population comes from Louisiana, which means out of the thousands of people held by the Bureau of Prisons in those districts, only about 46 people are likely Louisiana residents. And the chances of all or most of that group being actual residents of Districts 22 or 32 are incredibly slim.

Similarly, immigration detention facilities also skew Louisiana’s district populations beyond those districts highlighted above. Of the 20 largest U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities in the country, five are in the state, leaving Louisiana residents’ access to equal representation uniquely vulnerable to the ebb and flow of federal confinement policies. The U.S. Constitution is clear: all residents — regardless of their legal status — must be counted by the Census Bureau every ten years. The question isn’t whether they should be counted but where. Most people detained in immigration facilities in Louisiana spend less than a month in that facility, so it makes no sense to count them as if they were residents of the town where the facility happens to be located on Census Day.

Simply put, being incarcerated in a specific facility doesn’t make someone a resident of the surrounding district.

Prison gerrymandering harms Louisiana’s rural residents

Incarcerated people come from all over Louisiana, but rural parishes have the highest incarceration rates in the state. Incarcerated people in Louisiana come from every corner of the state; every single one of the state’s 64 parishes has its residents counted as if they were residents of another parish due to the way the Census Bureau counts incarcerated people. While the largest number of incarcerated people come from the most populous parishes, on a per-capita basis, rural parishes lose the largest shares of their populations to the Bureau’s counts.

Map of Louisiana parishes showing the incarceration rate per parish This map shows the portion of each parish’s population that is missing from the parish’s Census counts due to incarceration. This map and analysis come from our Where people in prison come from: The geography of mass incarceration in Louisiana report, and details on each parish, including the raw numbers, are available in the “Parishes” appendix there.

And small cities such as Bogalusa, Ville Platte, Bastrop, and Marksville have imprisonment rates higher than New Orleans, Shreveport, and Baton Rouge, though more incarcerated people come from the larger cities.

So while a few rural communities with large prisons claim residents from other parts of the state all over the state, they are claiming residents of other rural communities too. That means that while a few rural communities benefit from counting incarcerated people as if they were local residents, on the whole, counting incarcerated people in the wrong place harms most rural communities.

Prison gerrymandering disproportionately impacts Louisiana’s Black residents

Prison gerrymandering reduces the political power of nearly all Louisiana residents by allowing a few districts with large correctional facilities to claim residents from all over the state. And while it does that, it also enshrines the racial inequities of mass incarceration into the state’s legislative districts.

In Louisiana, like across the country, mass incarceration has a disproportionate impact along racial lines. In Louisiana, Black residents are incarcerated at disproportionate rates and therefore, counted in the wrong place more often than Louisiana’s white residents.

Graph comparing Louisiana’s resident and incarcerated populations. Showing the percentage of state residents, by race, compared to the percentage of people in the state’s prisons and jails, by race.

Black residents make up only 32% of the state population, but 66% of people in prisons and 57% of people in jails. A stark contrast to the white population, which makes up 58% of the state but only 34% of the prison population and 38% of the jail population.

Counting incarcerated people in the wrong place adds up. Just in the three districts highlighted in this report, an estimated 7,000 Black people were counted in the wrong place. This means that the Census Bureau policies are effectively silencing the voices of a large portion of the state’s Black residents.

Louisiana law says a prison cell is not a residence. Census Bureau policy disagrees

Not only does the Census Bureau’s redistricting data skew representation, it also doesn’t comply with Louisiana’s residence law. The state’s statute on voting residence — determining where someone is represented — is clear that just being present in a place doesn’t make you a resident there. It explicitly requires a person to have an intent to reside there indefinitely:

“For purposes of the laws governing voter registration and voting, ‘resident’ means a citizen who resides in this state and in the parish, municipality, if any, and precinct in which he offers to register and vote, with an intention to reside there indefinitely.”

Louisiana Annotated Revised Statutes S 18:101(B)

Instead of following state law, though, the Census Bureau follows its own “residence rule” to choose where to count incarcerated people — where they “live and sleep most of the time.” But it doesn’t even follow its own rule properly.

The Census Bureau counts incarcerated people at the location of the specific facility where they happen to be held on Census Day under the mistaken belief that is where incarcerated people “live and sleep most of the time.” The facts, however, do not support its interpretation of its own definition of residence. It is well-established that in the modern era of mass incarceration, incarcerated people do not “live and sleep most of the time” at the facility where they are held on any given day (including Census Day). Nationally, 75% of people serve time in more than one prison facility, and 12% of people serve time in at least five facilities before returning home . And, as a general rule, incarcerated people tend to return home rather than stay at the correctional facility or the surrounding community indefinitely.

Louisiana is long overdue to correct its redistricting data to match its residence law and the realities of where incarcerated people actually reside. In fact, some local governments in Louisiana have actually already started doing that on their own when drawing city or parish district lines.

Most local governments are already tackling prison gerrymandering on their own

The impact of prison gerrymandering is most clearly visible at the small scale: city and parish governments. With smaller districts at the local government level, even a single facility can have a tremendous impact on the redistricting process.

For example, in Madison Parish, there are two Police Jury Districts — Districts 2 and 3 — where incarcerated people account for 11 and 17% of the districts’ populations, respectively. District 2 contains the Louisiana Transitional Center for Women, and District 3 contains the Madison Parish Correctional and Detention Centers. That means 89 people in Policy Jury District 2, and 83 people in Police Jury District 3 have the same power as 100 people in Police Jury Districts 1, 4, and 5.

Recognizing the problems created by the Census Bureau’s data, most places in Louisiana that have significant correctional facility populations have already started taking matters into their own hands to avoid prison gerrymandering. Last decade, Allen and Catahoula Parishes drew maps where correctional facilities accounted for over half of a district’s population.2 This decade Allena and Catahoula avoided prison gerrymandering for the first time, joining 17 other Louisiana local governments that avoided prison gerrymandering in 2010: Avoyelles, Caldwell, Claiborne, Concordia, East Carroll, East Feliciana, Evangeline, Grant, Iberville, La Salle, Richland, West Carroll, West Feliciana, Winn Parishes, and Town of Amite City, and the City of Oakdale.3

In most cases, adjusting redistricting data to avoid prison gerrymandering is quite easy for local governments. The state, however, can provide a more efficient and complete solution for its local governments. Although it is not fair that Louisiana has to correct this federal issue, the state is in a better position to take on that burden than each individual city and parish.

Nationally, state and local governments are addressing the problem, but Louisiana is lagging behind

Over the course of the last few decades, over 200 local governments and a growing number of states have taken action on their own to fix this problem. Nearly half of the US population now lives in a place that corrects redistricting data they receive from the Census to avoid prison gerrymandering.

States that have ended prison gerrymandering on their own include deep “blue” states like California, “purple” states like Maine and Pennsylvania, and deep “red” states like Montana — where prison gerrymandering-reform legislation received wide bipartisan support. But Louisianans are falling behind, letting the state’s democracy continue to be skewed by an outdated federal system.

Louisiana needs to take action now

Avoiding prison gerrymandering is now well-tested with a proven track record. In fact, the bipartisan National Conference of State Legislatures called this effort “the fastest-growing trend in redistricting.“ Louisiana can now confidently pass legislation to count incarcerated people at home for redistricting purposes. The process of counting incarcerated people at home has been a success for the states that have done it. And Louisiana would have the benefit of refining its approach based on lessons learned by states that have gone through the process before. And it is easier than ever for states to act; even the Census Bureau is starting to acknowledge the problem and help.

2030 may seem far from now, but other states have learned that the earlier that reforms are put in place, the less expensive, easier to produce, and more accurate the final redistricting data becomes. Every state has a different legislative approach to ending prison gerrymandering, but as a practical matter, this model bill, prepared by a coalition of civil rights, voting rights, and criminal justice organizations, is a great place to start.4 It provides clear guidance on how this data should be collected, by whom, and how it will be used for the redistricting process.

And if Louisiana wants to avoid prison gerrymandering while redrawing its maps in response to the court order, then the state legislature can do so as part of the redistricting process — similar to the independent action by the redistricting bodies in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Montana.

The one option that Louisiana does not have is waiting for the Census Bureau to solve the problem for them. The Bureau is unlikely to effect change even in time for the 2030 Census, meaning that unless Louisiana acts quickly, the state will once again be driven into prison-gerrymandering their legislative districts.

Appendix: Correctional facility populations in Louisiana State House Districts, 2020 Census

State House District Total Population Incarcerated Population Percent of the District that is Incarcerated
1 44,941 0 0.0%
2 45,642 0 0.0%
3 46,122 0 0.0%
4 46,405 1214 2.6%
5 45,375 37 0.1%
6 44,174 0 0.0%
7 43,279 89 0.2%
8 45,325 14 0.0%
9 43,401 0 0.0%
10 44,137 965 2.2%
11 42,458 1670 3.9%
12 45,889 393 0.9%
13 44,187 1821 4.1%
14 44,279 0 0.0%
15 43,934 0 0.0%
16 42,328 864 2.0%
17 42,807 2503 5.8%
18 46,494 5284 11.4%
19 43,183 859 2.0%
20 42,204 1220 2.9%
21 44,329 2733 6.2%
22 43,238 5073 11.7%
23 42,708 1708 4.0%
24 42,692 120 0.3%
25 43,136 0 0.0%
26 44,636 758 1.7%
27 44,225 0 0.0%
28 42,851 2101 4.9%
29 44,544 517 1.2%
30 42,313 248 0.6%
31 46,510 0 0.0%
32 42,409 3506 8.3%
33 44,243 0 0.0%
34 45,879 1018 2.2%
35 45,975 0 0.0%
36 45,062 0 0.0%
37 45,672 244 0.5%
38 42,309 576 1.4%
39 42,262 0 0.0%
40 45,296 277 0.6%
41 44,744 421 0.9%
42 45,662 49 0.1%
43 42,630 0 0.0%
44 42,506 1339 3.2%
45 43,372 0 0.0%
46 43,596 0 0.0%
47 46,480 24 0.1%
48 45,339 374 0.8%
49 45,670 0 0.0%
50 43,190 250 0.6%
51 46,319 407 0.9%
52 43,163 0 0.0%
53 43,160 505 1.2%
54 42,849 0 0.0%
55 45,124 168 0.4%
56 46,361 0 0.0%
57 42,697 587 1.4%
58 45,194 311 0.7%
59 45,699 0 0.0%
60 44,864 2310 5.1%
61 44,049 0 0.0%
62 42,969 1750 4.1%
63 44,638 2008 4.5%
64 45,619 0 0.0%
65 44,189 0 0.0%
66 43,703 0 0.0%
67 43,566 0 0.0%
68 44,607 0 0.0%
69 46,550 0 0.0%
70 45,398 0 0.0%
71 43,001 0 0.0%
72 42,817 940 2.2%
73 46,503 0 0.0%
74 44,185 0 0.0%
75 45,463 1454 3.2%
76 43,228 0 0.0%
77 43,291 319 0.7%
78 44,584 0 0.0%
79 45,579 0 0.0%
80 46,249 0 0.0%
81 43,632 45 0.1%
82 46,202 0 0.0%
83 43,956 0 0.0%
84 42,520 0 0.0%
85 44,303 0 0.0%
86 45,736 0 0.0%
87 45,538 930 2.0%
88 42,542 0 0.0%
89 45,218 0 0.0%
90 43,451 0 0.0%
91 42,508 0 0.0%
92 45,176 0 0.0%
93 44,224 0 0.0%
94 45,685 0 0.0%
95 43,337 541 1.2%
96 45,706 29 0.1%
97 45,713 13 0.0%
98 43,431 0 0.0%
99 45,922 0 0.0%
100 44,360 0 0.0%
101 45,346 0 0.0%
102 45,264 0 0.0%
103 43,764 155 0.4%
104 45,197 0 0.0%
105 43,366 500 1.2%

Table notes

Total Population
Total population reported for all blocks in the district (as redistricted in 2022). Block populations reported for the 2020 Census in the PL 94-171 redistricting summary files Table P1.
Incarcerated Population
Total incarcerated population reported in all blocks in the district (as redistricted in 2022), based on the incarcerated population in group quarters reported for the 2020 Census in the PL 94-171 redistricting summary files Table P5.
Percent of the District that is Incarcerated
This is the number of incarcerated people counted in the district divided by the total Census population of the district.

See the full appendix

About the Data

Correctional Facility Populations: To calculate the percentage of each district’s population that was in correctional facilities, we used the redistricting data (PL 94-171) from the 2020 Census. Table P1 provides the total population for each Census block and Table P5 provides the number of incarcerated people for each Census Block. Notably, this approach includes people in all kinds of correctional facilities, including state prisons, federal prisons, private prisons, local jails, halfway houses, etc.

Identifying specific facilities: Table P5 provides the population of correctional facilities without distinguishing between state, federal, or private facilities and it is published for each Census block. Census blocks do not necessarily translate directly to facilities, as some facilities are counted in multiple blocks and some blocks contain multiple facilities. To aid redistricting officials and advocates with using this data, the Prison Policy Initiative maintains a Facility Locator Tool that contains annotations of most of the Census blocks in the country that contain correctional facilities. These annotations rely on publicly-available data to identify facility names and types in each of these blocks.

Calculating how many Louisiana residents are held by the Bureau of Prisons:
Our calculations on the number of people in federal prisons in each state are based on data provided by the Bureau of Prisons in response to our periodic Freedom of Information Act requests. We’ve archived their response from 2020 here.

How this report quantifies prison gerrymandering compared to other analyses: There are a few ways to calculate the impact of prison gerrymandering, so other researchers may have used slightly different approaches that generate slightly different numbers for the same general problem. For example, some analyses only focus on prisons and exclude jail populations. That choice makes sense when looking at state-level policies and state districts because people in jails are very likely to also live in the legislative district where the jail is located. However, for this analysis, we included jails as well as state correctional facilities because jails in Louisiana regularly hold a significant number of people for state authorities. Still other approaches, such as that taken by the Redistricting Data Hub, are based on estimates of incarcerated people’s home addresses. That approach adds an additional level of precision for counting people held in state facilities because it seeks to not only address where these people were counted incorrectly — which accounts for the bulk of prison gerrymandering’s population distortion — but to also estimate where they should have been counted. Unfortunately, this approach isn’t able to reflect where people in federal facilities, most jails, and private facilities are from. And so, for simplicity, this report doesn’t use that approach.

Each of these approaches has its own merits, and none are universally better than others; they all highlight different aspects of how prison gerrymandering skews population numbers, and each has its own use. This complex weave of data also points to the need for the Census Bureau to count incarcerated people at home in the first place in order to provide a comprehensive solution to prison gerrymandering.

Footnotes

  1. Annotated Revised Statutes S 18:101(B)  ↩

  2. In our research conducted into the previous (2010) round of redistricting, we discovered notable prison gerrymandering in an additional 13 parishes however we did not update this research for the 2020 round of redistricting: Beauregard, Franklin, Jackson, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Orleans, Ouachita, Rapides, Union, Washington, Webster, and West Baton Rouge Parishes.

    While we do not know for sure if these local governments continue to engage in prison gerrymandering, we hope that this list will be a good starting point for other advocates or researchers who wish to look for additional examples of local governments in Louisiana that continue to engage in prison gerrymandering or that have decided they no longer wish to engage in the practice.
     ↩

  3. Nationwide we identified hundreds of governments that avoided prison gerrymandering after the 2000 and 2010 Censuses (decades when zero and two, respectively, states adjusted their redistricting data to count people at home). This decade we limited the scope of our research but still found an additional 21 local governments scattered across 10 states that started doing so after the 2020 Census despite those states continuing to use unadjusted data for state-level districts. Louisiana is one of those states. Allen and Catahoula Parishes avoided prison gerrymandering for the first time in the 2020 redistricting cycle.
     ↩

  4. When choosing how to adapt the model legislation to Louisiana’s needs, the state should consider its use of private prisons, its reliance on local jails for state-level incarceration, as well as the presence of federal facilities. Past bills, such as HB265, introduced in the 2020 session, that are based on the model bill may also offer a good place to start.
     ↩


North Carolina’s redistricting data was once again skewed after the 2020 Census; the state needs to take action to fix the issue for 2030.

by Aleks Kajstura, May 13, 2025

Everyone in North Carolina is supposed to have an equal voice in their government’s decisions, but an outdated and misguided Census Bureau policy that counts incarcerated people in the wrong place gives a few residents of the state a megaphone. It is a problem known as prison gerrymandering, and North Carolina lawmakers can fix it.

North Carolina blindly follows outdated bureaucratic federal policy

Every ten years, when the Census Bureau conducts its official tally of the nation’s population, it incorrectly counts incarcerated people as residents of prison cells rather than in their home communities. This is despite the fact that they usually are not from the prison town, have no family or social ties there, likely won’t stay there for long, and state residence law1 says they’re not residents there. When state officials then use that incorrect Census data in the legislative redistricting process, they inadvertently inflate the populations of those areas — in violation of constitutional principles of equal representation. This gives residents of state legislative districts that contain correctional facilities a particularly loud voice in government, allowing them to have an outsized influence on debates about funding childcare centers, determining pollution liability, streamlining road maintenance, permit requirements for carrying guns, and more, at the expense of nearly every other person in the state.

That is why states across the country have taken steps to fix the problem that the Census Bureau created. But, North Carolina is one of the remaining states still suffering from this “prison gerrymandering.” While the 2030 Census count is still years away, North Carolina needs to act now to avoid prison gerrymandering the next time it redraws its districts.

Prison gerrymandering significantly distorts North Carolina’s state legislative districts

In North Carolina, there are three State House districts that powerfully illustrate how prisons distort district populations and give some residents a louder voice in government as a result of prison gerrymandering.

In these three State House districts — districts 12, 32, and 38 — correctional facilities account for roughly 4% of the population. That means that just 96 residents of those districts have as much political clout as 100 residents in any other district. That imbalance in representation comes from the state choosing to redistrict based on Census numbers that don’t match the reality of where people live.

Three most prison-gerrymandered State House Districts in North Carolina:

These three districts are the most prison-gerrymandered in North Carolina. For details on all districts, see the Appendix
State House District District Location Facilities in the district include Percent of the district that is incarcerated
District 12 Greene, Jones, Lenoir Counties Eastern Correctional Institution, Greene Correctional Institution, Maury Correctional Institution 3.8%
District 38 Part of Wake County N.C. Correctional Institution for Women, Wake Correctional Center, Wake County Detention Annex, Caval Corp Community Sanction Center, Wake County Jail 3.7%
District 32 Granville and part of Vance Counties FCI Butner (part), Polk Correctional Institution 3.7%

These three districts showcase the various ways that correctional facilities contribute to prison gerrymandering. All three districts have roughly the same level of prison gerrymandering, but the types of correctional facilities in each vary:

  • District 12 contains state facilities run by the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction Facilities, which means that people incarcerated there live all over the state.
  • District 38 contains state facilities as well as a county jail. While it is true that most people in county jails come from the county where the jail is located, in this instance, the people confined there are still likely counted in the wrong legislative district. That’s because the county is split among 13 State House districts.
  • District 32 contains a federal correctional facility run by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which means that people there come from all over the U.S. Only about 4% of people incarcerated by the Bureau of Prisons are North Carolina residents, meaning that of the 2,023 people counted at the Butner facility that were allocated to this district, only 81 are likely North Carolina residents, and the chances of all or most of that group being actual residents of District 32 are incredibly slim.

Correctional agencies regularly move thousands of people in, out, and across the state. Distributing political power based on where incarcerated people happen to be held on Census Day makes no sense.

Prison gerrymandering disproportionately harms North Carolinians living in rural areas

Based on our analysis of Department of Adult Correction records, incarcerated people in North Carolina come disproportionately from rural areas. Rural counties account for 35% of the state’s population, but 40% of people incarcerated in North Carolina come from rural counties. Prison gerrymandering shifts populations away from most rural communities in the state and concentrates power in the few areas that have amassed the largest prisons.

Graph comparing North Carolina's rural county population and incarcerated population from rural counties.

Also, contrary to common assumption, prison gerrymandering has no partisan benefit in North Carolina. A partisan analysis of prison gerrymandering published by the Redistricting Data Hub found that prison gerrymandering has an equal impact on Republican and Democratic districts.

Prison gerrymandering disproportionately harms Black and Native American North Carolinians

Prison gerrymandering reduces the political power of nearly all North Carolina residents by allowing a few districts with large correctional facilities to claim residents from all over the state. And while it does that, it also enshrines the racial inequities of mass incarceration into the state’s legislative districts.

In North Carolina, like across the country, mass incarceration has a disproportionate impact along racial lines. In North Carolina, Black residents are incarcerated at disproportionate rates and, therefore counted in the wrong place more often than North Carolina’s white residents.

Graph comparing North Carolina's resident and incarcerated populations. Showing the percentage of state residents, by race, compared to the percentage of people in the state's prisons and jails, by race.

Black residents make up 21% of the state population, but a whopping 50% of people in prisons and 47% of people in jails.

Native American residents are also disproportionately impacted, making up just 1% of the state population but 2% of people in prisons and 1.3% of people in jails. That means they are incarcerated at roughly twice the rate you would expect based on their population.

Both are a stark contrast to the white population, which makes up 62% of the state but only 41% of the prison population and 47% of the jail population.

Counting incarcerated people in the wrong place adds up. Just in the three districts highlighted above, nearly 4,500 Black people were counted in the wrong place. This means that the Census Bureau policies are effectively silencing the voices of a large portion of the state’s Black residents.

North Carolina law says a prison cell is not a residence. Census Bureau policy disagrees

Not only does the Census Bureau’s redistricting data cause prison gerrymandering, it also doesn’t comply with North Carolina’s law. The state’s residence statute explicitly states that incarceration doesn’t change a person’s residence. They do not lose residence at their home address, and they do not gain residence at the correctional facility where they are held:

A person shall not be considered to have lost that person’s residence if that person leaves home… with the intention of returning

“A person shall not be considered to have gained a residence … without the intention of making that county, municipality, precinct, ward, or other election district a permanent place of abode.

N.C. Gen. Stat. S 163-57(2) and (3)

Instead of following state law, though, the Census Bureau follows its own “residence rule” to choose where to count incarcerated people — where they “live and sleep most of the time.” But it doesn’t even follow this rule properly.

The Census Bureau counts incarcerated people at the location of the facility where they happen to be held on Census Day under the mistaken belief that is where incarcerated people “live and sleep most of the time.” The facts, however, do not support its interpretation of its own definition of residence. It is well-established that in the modern era of mass incarceration, incarcerated people do not “live and sleep most of the time” at the facility where they are held on any given day (including Census Day). Nationally, 75% of people serve time in more than one prison facility, and 12% of people serve time in at least five facilities before returning home.

North Carolina is long overdue to correct its redistricting data to match its residence law and the realities of where incarcerated people actually reside. In fact, some local governments in North Carolina have already started doing that on their own when drawing city or county district lines.

Some local governments are already tackling prison gerrymandering on their own

The impact of prison gerrymandering is most clearly visible at the small scale: city and county governments. With smaller districts at the city or county level, even a single facility can have a tremendous impact on the redistricting process.

For example, in the City of Lumberton, there is a city council district where incarcerated people account for 47% of the district’s population. The district contains the Lumberton Correctional Institution and Robeson County Jail. The result is that 53 people in that district have the same power as 100 people in the other seven city council districts.2

Additionally, what the city may not have realized when it relied on the Census Bureau’s redistricting data, is that the jail, which actually sits outside of city limits, was counted in the wrong spot — as if it were part of the state facility next door (the state facility is actually within the city’s boundary). These sorts of errors are a common feature of the Census Bureau’s correctional facility counts, and that makes relying on the Census Bureau’s prison counts even more problematic.

Facing these absurd outcomes, some of North Carolina’s local governments have already started taking matters into their own hands and rejecting the Bureau’s way of counting incarcerated people. In the two latest redistricting cycles, at least three local governments in North Carolina have avoided prison gerrymandering to ensure their residents have equal representation in local government: Caswell, Columbus, and Granville Counties.3

In most cases, adjusting redistricting data to avoid prison gerrymandering is quite easy for local governments. However, the state can provide a more efficient and complete solution for its local governments. Although it is not fair that the state has to correct for this federal issue, the state is in a better position to take on that burden than each individual city and county.

Nationally, state and local governments are addressing the problem, but North Carolina is lagging behind

Over the course of the last few decades, over 200 local governments and a growing number of states, have taken action on their own to fix this problem. Nearly half of the US population now lives in a place that corrects redistricting data they receive from the Census to avoid prison gerrymandering.

States that have ended prison gerrymandering on their own include deep “blue” states like California, “purple” states like Maine and Pennsylvania, and deep “red” states like Montana — where prison gerrymandering-reform legislation received wide bipartisan support. But North Carolinians are falling behind, letting the state’s democracy continue to be skewed by an outdated federal system.

North Carolina needs to take action now

Avoiding prison gerrymandering is now well-tested with a proven track record. In fact, the bipartisan National Conference of State Legislatures called this effort “the fastest-growing trend in redistricting.” North Carolina can now confidently pass legislation to count incarcerated people at home for redistricting purposes. Other states have already been successful in these efforts, paving the way for North Carolina. And the state would have the benefit of refining its approach based on lessons learned by states that have gone through the process before. And it is easier than ever for states to act; even the Census Bureau is starting to acknowledge the problem and help.

2030 may seem far away but other states have learned that the earlier that reforms are put in place, the less expensive, easier to produce, and more accurate the final redistricting data becomes. Every state has a different legislative approach to ending prison gerrymandering, but as a practical matter, this model bill, prepared by a coalition of civil rights, voting rights, and criminal justice organizations, is a great place to start. It provides clear guidance on how this data should be collected, by whom, and how it will be used for the redistricting process.

The Census Bureau is unlikely to change its policies about how to count incarcerated people in time for the 2030 Census, meaning that unless North Carolina acts quickly, the state will once again be driven into prison-gerrymandering their legislative districts.

North Carolina needs to end prison gerrymandering now.

Appendix: Correctional facility populations in North Carolina State House Districts, 2020 Census

State House District Total Population Incarcerated Population Percent of the District that is Incarcerated
1 82812 63 0.1%
2 90751 2511 2.8%
3 84906 818 1.0%
4 83034 0 0.0%
5 82953 2306 2.8%
6 90919 966 1.1%
7 83541 764 0.9%
8 83559 357 0.4%
9 86684 0 0.0%
10 83014 1388 1.7%
11 86381 0 0.0%
12 84745 3229 3.8%
13 83500 424 0.5%
14 88470 237 0.3%
15 91212 0 0.0%
16 85097 742 0.9%
17 90514 0 0.0%
18 89413 0 0.0%
19 91288 241 0.3%
20 91180 597 0.7%
21 87764 0 0.0%
22 88642 694 0.8%
23 88865 1491 1.7%
24 83322 154 0.2%
25 90432 770 0.9%
26 89947 0 0.0%
27 84735 1658 2.0%
28 85389 865 1.0%
29 90900 0 0.0%
30 91038 14 0.0%
31 91241 277 0.3%
32 88602 3235 3.7%
33 85001 17 0.0%
34 89807 0 0.0%
35 83094 0 0.0%
36 86038 0 0.0%
37 90307 0 0.0%
38 86444 3190 3.7%
39 85371 0 0.0%
40 86359 0 0.0%
41 89876 0 0.0%
42 82965 0 0.0%
43 85335 0 0.0%
44 82683 535 0.6%
45 83745 0 0.0%
46 83701 2187 2.6%
47 83452 1060 1.3%
48 86256 2755 3.2%
49 84251 825 1.0%
50 86290 1539 1.8%
51 83073 416 0.5%
52 84383 716 0.8%
53 83312 0 0.0%
54 83475 66 0.1%
55 82927 1598 1.9%
56 85142 0 0.0%
57 90259 0 0.0%
58 90051 0 0.0%
59 90829 0 0.0%
60 90340 238 0.3%
61 90183 654 0.7%
62 89637 0 0.0%
63 83847 0 0.0%
64 87568 397 0.5%
65 91096 173 0.2%
66 88717 0 0.0%
67 88255 1329 1.5%
68 88209 0 0.0%
69 89186 0 0.0%
70 89118 448 0.5%
71 88823 0 0.0%
72 84444 913 1.1%
73 90036 555 0.6%
74 83545 0 0.0%
75 87378 0 0.0%
76 89815 1174 1.3%
77 90628 136 0.2%
78 86365 0 0.0%
79 84681 1219 1.4%
80 83289 0 0.0%
81 85641 647 0.8%
82 91227 0 0.0%
83 90899 0 0.0%
84 86773 324 0.4%
85 90770 2791 3.1%
86 87570 1145 1.3%
87 85009 413 0.5%
88 84505 0 0.0%
89 85577 443 0.5%
90 88208 150 0.2%
91 82920 103 0.1%
92 87079 10 0.0%
93 87194 225 0.3%
94 85564 1690 2.0%
95 85366 0 0.0%
96 89587 0 0.0%
97 86810 218 0.3%
98 82789 0 0.0%
99 84406 30 0.0%
100 86763 0 0.0%
101 84368 0 0.0%
102 84206 90 0.1%
103 89354 0 0.0%
104 83554 0 0.0%
105 85671 0 0.0%
106 86716 1454 1.7%
107 88854 0 0.0%
108 89468 686 0.8%
109 88881 0 0.0%
110 89459 255 0.3%
111 84508 0 0.0%
112 87217 0 0.0%
113 89151 510 0.6%
114 91120 365 0.4%
115 88875 656 0.7%
116 89457 369 0.4%
117 91035 155 0.2%
118 83282 86 0.1%
119 90212 125 0.1%
120 84907 218 0.3%

Table notes

Total Population
Total population reported for all blocks in the district (as redrawn in 2023). Block populations reported for the 2020 Census in the PL 94-171 redistricting summary files Table P1.
Incarcerated Population
Total incarcerated population reported in all blocks in the district (as redrawn in 2023), based on the incarcerated population in group quarters reported for the 2020 Census in the PL 94-171 redistricting summary files Table P5.
Percent of the District that is Incarcerated
This is the number of incarcerated people counted in the district divided by the total Census population of the district.

See the full appendix

About the Data

Correctional Facility Populations: To calculate the percentage of each district’s population that was in correctional facilities, we used the redistricting data (PL 94-171) from the 2020 Census. Table P1 provides the total population for each Census block and Table P5 provides the number of incarcerated people for each Census Block. Notably, this approach includes people in all kinds of correctional facilities, including state prisons, federal prisons, private prisons, local jails, halfway houses, etc.

Identifying specific facilities: Table P5 provides the population of correctional facilities without distinguishing between state, federal, or private facilities and it is published for each Census block. Census blocks do not necessarily translate directly to facilities, as some facilities are counted in multiple blocks and some blocks contain multiple facilities. To aid redistricting officials and advocates with using this data, the Prison Policy Initiative maintains a Facility Locator Tool that contains annotations of most of the Census blocks in the country that contain correctional facilities. These annotations rely on publicly-available data to identify facility names and types in each of these blocks.

Calculating how many North Carolina residents are held by the Bureau of Prisons:
Our calculations on the number of people in federal prisons in each state are based on data provided by the Bureau of Prisons in response to our periodic Freedom of Information Act requests. We’ve archived their response from 2020 at: https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/2020-bop-origin.pdf

How this report quantifies prison gerrymandering compared to other analyses: There are a few ways to calculate the impact of prison gerrymandering, so other researchers may have used slightly different approaches that generate slightly different numbers for the same general problem. For example, some analyses only focus on prisons and exclude jail populations. That choice makes sense when looking at state-level policies and state districts because people in jails are very likely to also live in the legislative district where the jail is located. However, for this analysis we included jails as well as state correctional facilities because Oklahoma regularly rents space in local jails to hold a significant number of people for state authorities. Still other approaches, such as that taken by the Redistricting Data Hub, are based on estimates of incarcerated people’s home addresses. That approach adds an additional level of precision for counting people held in state facilities because it seeks to not only address where these people were counted incorrectly — which accounts for the bulk of prison gerrymandering’s population distortion, — but to also estimate where they should have been counted. Unfortunately, this approach isn’t able to reflect where people in federal facilities, and most jails and private facilities are from. And so for simplicity this report doesn’t use that approach.

Each of these approaches have their own merits, and none are universally better than others; they all highlight different aspects of how prison gerrymandering skews population numbers, and each have their own use. This complex weave of data also points to the need for the Census Bureau to count incarcerated people at home in the first place in order to provide a comprehensive solution to prison gerrymandering.

Analysis of rural impact: We followed the NC Rural Center’s determinations in identifying rural counties. And we used the ASQ (Automated System Query) tool, available through the Administrative Analysis Section of the NC Department of Adult Correction to determine the home counties of incarcerated people.

Footnotes

  1. N.C. Gen. Stat. S 163-57(2) and (3)  ↩

  2. In our research conducted into the previous (2010) round of redistricting, we discovered notable prison gerrymandering in an additional 15 counties, cities, and school boards but where we did not have the resources to update our research for the 2020 round of redistricting: Anson County, Anson County Schools, Caswell County Schools, Clinton city, Edgecombe County, Franklin County, Franklin County Schools, Goldsboro city, Granville County Schools, Halifax County, Lumberton city, Pamlico County, Pamlico County Schools, Pasquotank County, and Robeson County.

    While we do not know for sure if these local governments continue to engage in prison gerrymandering, we hope that this list will be a good starting point for other advocates or researchers who wish to look for additional examples of local governments in North Carolina that continue to engage in prison gerrymandering or that have decided they no longer wish to engage in the practice.  ↩

  3. Nationwide we identified hundreds of governments that avoided prison gerrymandering after the 2000 and 2010 Censuses (decades when zero and two, respectively, states adjusted their redistricting data to count people at home). This decade we limited the scope of our research but still found an additional 21 local governments scattered across 10 states that started doing so after the 2020 Census despite those states continuing to use unadjusted data for state-level districts. North Carolina is one of those states; Granville County avoided prison gerrymandering for the first time in the 2020 redistricting cycle.  ↩



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