{"id":10623,"date":"2025-05-13T08:04:19","date_gmt":"2025-05-13T12:04:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/?p=10623"},"modified":"2025-11-03T17:58:54","modified_gmt":"2025-11-03T22:58:54","slug":"north_carolina_prison_gerrymandering","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/2025\/05\/13\/north_carolina_prison_gerrymandering\/","title":{"rendered":"Federal Census policy harms North Carolina&#8217;s democracy \u2014 state lawmakers can fix it"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>\nEveryone in North Carolina is supposed to have an equal voice in their government&#8217;s decisions, but an outdated and misguided Census Bureau policy that counts incarcerated people in the wrong place gives a few residents of the state a megaphone. It is a problem known as prison gerrymandering, and North Carolina lawmakers can fix it.   \n<\/p>\n<h2>North Carolina blindly follows outdated bureaucratic federal policy<\/h2>\n<p>\nEvery ten years, when the Census Bureau conducts its official tally of the nation&#8217;s population, it incorrectly counts incarcerated people as residents of prison cells rather than in their home communities. This is despite the fact that they usually are not from the prison town, have no family or social ties there, <a href=\"\/news\/2024\/05\/14\/home-addresses\/\">likely won&#8217;t stay there for long<\/a>, and state residence law<sup id=\"fnref:1\"><a href=\"#fn:1\">1<\/a><\/sup> says they&#8217;re not residents there. When state officials then use that incorrect Census data in the legislative redistricting process, they inadvertently inflate the populations of those areas &mdash; in violation of constitutional principles of equal representation. This gives residents of state legislative districts that contain correctional facilities a particularly loud voice in government, allowing them to have an outsized influence on debates about funding childcare centers, determining pollution liability, streamlining road maintenance, permit requirements for carrying guns, and more, at the expense of nearly every other person in the state.\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<span class=\"pullquote\" title=\"States across the country are taking steps to fix the problem. But North Carolina is one of the remaining states still suffering from this &#8220;prison gerrymandering.&#8221;\"><\/span>That is why states across the country have taken steps to fix the problem that the Census Bureau created. But, North Carolina is one of the remaining states still suffering from this &#8220;prison gerrymandering.&#8221; While the 2030 Census count is still years away, North Carolina needs to act now to avoid prison gerrymandering the next time it redraws its districts.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Prison gerrymandering significantly distorts North Carolina&#8217;s state legislative districts<\/h2>\n<p>\nIn North Carolina, there are three State House districts that powerfully illustrate how prisons distort district populations and give some residents a louder voice in government as a result of prison gerrymandering.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nIn these three State House districts &mdash; districts 12, 32, and 38 &mdash; correctional facilities account for roughly 4% of the population. That means that just 96 residents of those districts have as much political clout as 100 residents in any other district. That imbalance in representation comes from the state choosing to redistrict based on Census numbers that don&#8217;t match the reality of where people live.\n<\/p>\n<div>\n<h3 class=\"tableheader\">Three most prison-gerrymandered State House Districts in North Carolina:<\/h3>\n<table class=\"airy firstcolth text centercells\">\n<caption>These three districts are the most prison-gerrymandered in North Carolina. For details on all districts, see the <a href=\"#appendix\">Appendix<\/a><\/caption>\n<tr>\n<th>State&nbsp;House District<\/th>\n<th>District Location<\/th>\n<th>Facilities in the district include<\/th>\n<th>Percent&nbsp;of&nbsp;the&nbsp;district that&nbsp;is&nbsp;incarcerated<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>District 12<\/td>\n<td>Greene, Jones, Lenoir Counties<\/td>\n<td>Eastern Correctional Institution, Greene Correctional Institution, Maury Correctional Institution<\/td>\n<td>3.8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>District 38<\/td>\n<td>Part of Wake County<\/td>\n<td>N.C. Correctional Institution for Women, Wake Correctional Center, Wake County Detention Annex, Caval Corp Community Sanction Center, Wake County Jail<\/td>\n<td>3.7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>District 32<\/td>\n<td>Granville and part of Vance Counties<\/td>\n<td>FCI Butner (part), Polk Correctional Institution<\/td>\n<td>3.7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"prelist\">\nThese three districts showcase the various ways that correctional facilities contribute to prison gerrymandering. All three districts have roughly the same level of prison gerrymandering, but the types of correctional facilities in each vary:\n<\/p>\n<ul class=\"list\">\n<li>District 12 contains state facilities run by the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction Facilities, which means that people incarcerated there live all over the state. <\/li>\n<li>District 38 contains state facilities as well as a county jail. While it is true that most people in county jails come from the county where the jail is located, in this instance, the people confined there are still likely counted in the wrong legislative district. That&#8217;s because the county is split among 13 State House districts.<\/li>\n<li>District 32 contains a federal correctional facility run by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which means that people there come from all over the U.S. Only about <a href=\"\/\/static.prisonpolicy.org\/scans\/2020-bop-origin.pdf\">4% of people incarcerated by the Bureau of Prisons are North Carolina residents<\/a>, meaning that of the 2,023 people counted at the Butner facility that were allocated to this district, only 81 are likely North Carolina residents, and the chances of all or most of that group being actual residents of District 32 are incredibly slim.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nCorrectional agencies regularly move thousands of people in, out, and across the state. Distributing political power based on where incarcerated people happen to be held on Census Day makes no sense.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Prison gerrymandering disproportionately harms North Carolinians living in rural areas <\/h2>\n<p>\nBased on <a href=\"#analysis\">our analysis<\/a> of Department of Adult Correction records, incarcerated people in North Carolina come disproportionately from rural areas. Rural counties account for 35% of the state&#8217;s population, but 40% of people incarcerated in North Carolina come from rural counties. Prison gerrymandering shifts populations away from most rural communities in the state and concentrates power in the few areas that have amassed the largest prisons.\n<\/p>\n<div class=\"popoutright\">\n<picture><source type=\"image\/webp\" srcset=\"\/\/static.prisonpolicy.org\/images\/NC_rural_incarc.webp 1x, \/\/static.prisonpolicy.org\/images\/NC_rural_incarc-2X.webp 2x\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"\/\/static.prisonpolicy.org\/images\/NC_rural_incarc.png\" alt=\"Graph comparing North Carolina's rural county population and incarcerated population from rural counties.\">\n<\/picture>\n<\/div>\n<p>\nAlso, contrary to common assumption, prison gerrymandering has no partisan benefit in North Carolina. A <a href=\"https:\/\/redistrictingdatahub.org\/dataset\/report-on-prison-gerrymandering-in-north-carolina\">partisan analysis of prison gerrymandering published by the Redistricting Data Hub<\/a> found that prison gerrymandering has an equal impact on Republican and Democratic districts.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Prison gerrymandering disproportionately harms Black and Native American North Carolinians<\/h2>\n<p>\nPrison gerrymandering reduces the political power of nearly all North Carolina residents by allowing a few districts with large correctional facilities to claim residents from all over the state. And while it does that, it also enshrines the racial inequities of mass incarceration into the state&#8217;s legislative districts.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nIn North Carolina, like across the country, mass incarceration has a disproportionate impact along racial lines. In North Carolina, Black residents are incarcerated at disproportionate rates and, therefore counted in the wrong place more often than North Carolina&#8217;s white residents.\n<\/p>\n<picture><source type=\"image\/webp\" srcset=\"\/\/static.prisonpolicy.org\/images\/NC_incarc_residents_race.webp 1x, \/\/static.prisonpolicy.org\/images\/NC_incarc_residents_race-2X.webp 2x\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"\/\/static.prisonpolicy.org\/images\/NC_incarc_residents_race.png\" alt=\"Graph comparing North Carolina's resident and incarcerated populations. Showing the percentage of state residents, by race, compared to the percentage of people in the state's prisons and jails, by race.\" width=\"800\" height=\"600\" class=\"featureimage tightfeature\">\n<\/picture>\n<p>\nBlack residents make up 21% of the state population, but a whopping 50% of people in prisons and 47% of people in jails.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nNative American residents are also disproportionately impacted, making up just 1% of the state population but 2% of people in prisons and 1.3% of people in jails. That means they are incarcerated at roughly twice the rate you would expect based on their population.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nBoth are a stark contrast to the white population, which makes up 62% of the state but only 41% of the prison population and 47% of the jail population.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nCounting incarcerated people in the wrong place adds up. Just in the three districts highlighted above, nearly 4,500 Black people were counted in the wrong place. This means that the Census Bureau policies are effectively silencing the voices of a large portion of the state&#8217;s Black residents.\n<\/p>\n<h2>North Carolina law says a prison cell is not a residence. Census Bureau policy disagrees<\/h2>\n<p>Not only does the Census Bureau&#8217;s redistricting data cause prison gerrymandering, it also doesn&#8217;t comply with North Carolina&#8217;s law. The state&#8217;s residence statute explicitly states that incarceration doesn&#8217;t change a person&#8217;s residence. They do not lose residence at their home address, and they do not gain residence at the correctional facility where they are held:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"torn\">\n<p>A person shall not be considered to have lost that person&#8217;s residence if that person leaves home&#8230; with the intention of returning<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;A person shall not be considered to have gained a residence &#8230; without the intention of making that county, municipality, precinct, ward, or other election district a permanent place of abode.<\/p>\n<p class=\"right\" style=\"padding-right:10%; font-style:italic;font-size:12px;\">N.C. Gen. Stat. S 163-57(2) and (3)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>\nInstead of following state law, though, the Census Bureau follows its own &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.census.gov\/content\/dam\/Census\/programs-surveys\/decennial\/2020-census\/2020-Census-Residence-Criteria.pdf\">residence rule<\/a>&#8221; to choose where to count incarcerated people &mdash; where they &#8220;live and sleep most of the time.&#8221; But it doesn&#8217;t even follow this rule properly.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nThe Census Bureau counts incarcerated people at the location of the facility where they happen to be held on Census Day under the mistaken belief that is where incarcerated people &#8220;live and sleep most of the time.&#8221; The facts, however, do not support its interpretation of its own definition of residence. It is well-established that in the modern era of mass incarceration, incarcerated people do not &#8220;live and sleep most of the time&#8221; at the facility where they are held on any given day (including Census Day). Nationally, <a href=\"\/news\/2024\/05\/14\/home-addresses\/\">75% of people serve time in more than one prison facility, and 12% of people serve time in at least five facilities<\/a> before returning home.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nNorth Carolina is long overdue to correct its redistricting data to match its residence law and the realities of where incarcerated people actually reside. In fact, some local governments in North Carolina have already started doing that on their own when drawing city or county district lines.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Some local governments are already tackling prison gerrymandering on their own<\/h2>\n<p>\nThe impact of prison gerrymandering is most clearly visible at the small scale: city and county governments. With smaller districts at the city or county level, even a single facility can have a tremendous impact on the redistricting process.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nFor example, in the City of Lumberton, there is a city council district where incarcerated people account for 47% of the district&#8217;s population.<span class=\"pullquote\" title=\"53 people in a Lumberton City Council district had the same power as 100 people in the other city districts.\"><\/span> The district contains the Lumberton Correctional Institution and Robeson County Jail. The result is that 53 people in that district have the same power as 100 people in the other seven city council districts.<sup id=\"fnref:2\"><a href=\"#fn:2\">2<\/a><\/sup>\n<\/p>\n<p>\nAdditionally, what the city may not have realized when it relied on the Census Bureau&#8217;s redistricting data, is that the jail, which actually sits outside of city limits, was counted in the wrong spot &mdash; as if it were part of the state facility next door (the state facility <i>is<\/i> actually within the city&#8217;s boundary). These sorts of <a href=\"\/news\/2024\/10\/30\/group_quarters_errors\/\">errors are a common feature of the Census Bureau&#8217;s correctional facility counts<\/a>, and that makes relying on the Census Bureau&#8217;s prison counts even more problematic.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nFacing these absurd outcomes, some of North Carolina&#8217;s local governments have already started taking matters into their own hands and rejecting the Bureau&#8217;s way of counting incarcerated people. In the two latest redistricting cycles, at least three local governments in North Carolina have avoided prison gerrymandering to ensure their residents have equal representation in local government: Caswell, Columbus, and Granville Counties.<sup id=\"fnref:3\"><a href=\"#fn:3\">3<\/a><\/sup>\n<\/p>\n<p>\nIn most cases, <a href=\"\/factsheets\/national\/local_solutions.pdf\">adjusting redistricting data to avoid prison gerrymandering is quite easy for local governments<\/a>. However, the state can provide a more efficient and complete solution for its local governments. Although it is not fair that the state has to correct for this federal issue, the state is in a better position to take on that burden than each individual city and county.\n<\/p>\n<h2>Nationally, state and local governments are addressing the problem, but North Carolina is lagging behind<\/h2>\n<p>\nOver the course of the last few decades, over 200 local governments and <a href=\"\/legislation.html#enacted\">a growing number of states<\/a>, have taken action on their own to fix this problem. Nearly half of the US population now lives in a place that corrects redistricting data they receive from the Census to avoid prison gerrymandering.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nStates that have ended prison gerrymandering on their own include deep &#8220;blue&#8221; states like California, &#8220;purple&#8221; states like Maine and Pennsylvania, and deep &#8220;red&#8221; states like Montana &#8212; where prison gerrymandering-reform legislation received <a href=\"\/news\/2023\/04\/25\/montana_ends_prisongerrymandering\/\">wide bipartisan support<\/a>. But <a href=\"\/news\/2024\/02\/26\/worst-gerrymanders\/\">North Carolinians are falling behind<\/a>, letting the state&#8217;s democracy continue to be skewed by an outdated federal system.\n<\/p>\n<h2>North Carolina needs to take action now <\/h2>\n<p>\nAvoiding prison gerrymandering is now well-tested with a proven track record. In fact, the bipartisan National Conference of State Legislatures called this effort &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ncsl.org\/state-legislatures-news\/details\/reallocating-inmate-data-for-redistricting-its-not-a-yes-or-no-question\">the fastest-growing trend in redistricting<\/a>.&#8221; North Carolina can now confidently pass legislation to count incarcerated people at home for redistricting purposes. Other states have already been successful in these efforts, <a href=\"\/news\/2024\/06\/10\/state_success_rates\/\">paving the way for <\/a><a href=\"\/news\/2024\/06\/10\/state_success_rates\/\">North Carolina<\/a>. And the state would have the benefit of refining its approach based on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ncsl.org\/redistricting-and-census\/inmate-data-reallocation-in-the-2020-redistricting-cycle\">lessons learned by states that have gone through the process before<\/a>. And it is easier than ever for states to act; even <a href=\"\/news\/2025\/01\/30\/view-from-states-2030\/\">the Census Bureau is starting to acknowledge the problem and help<\/a>.\n<\/p>\n<p>\n2030 may seem far away but other states have learned that the earlier that reforms are put in place, the less expensive, easier to produce, and more accurate the final redistricting data becomes. <a href=\"\/models\/chart.html\">Every state has a different legislative approach to ending prison gerrymandering<\/a>, but as a practical matter, <a href=\"\/models\/example.html\">this model bill<\/a>, prepared by a coalition of civil rights, voting rights, and criminal justice organizations, is a great place to start. It provides clear guidance on how this data should be collected, by whom, and how it will be used for the redistricting process.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nThe Census Bureau is unlikely to change its policies about how to count incarcerated people in time for the 2030 Census, meaning that unless North Carolina acts quickly, the state will once again be driven into prison-gerrymandering their legislative districts.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nNorth Carolina needs to end prison gerrymandering now.\n<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"appendix\">Appendix: Correctional facility populations in North Carolina State House Districts, 2020 Census<\/h2>\n<div class=\"showexcerpt\">\n<table id=\"ncdistricts\" class=\"centercells fixedheader sortable topcaption\">\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>State House District<\/th>\n<th>Total Population<\/th>\n<th>Incarcerated Population<\/th>\n<th>Percent of the District that is Incarcerated<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>1<\/td>\n<td>82812<\/td>\n<td>63<\/td>\n<td>0.1%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<td>90751<\/td>\n<td>2511<\/td>\n<td>2.8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>3<\/td>\n<td>84906<\/td>\n<td>818<\/td>\n<td>1.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td>83034<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>5<\/td>\n<td>82953<\/td>\n<td>2306<\/td>\n<td>2.8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>6<\/td>\n<td>90919<\/td>\n<td>966<\/td>\n<td>1.1%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>7<\/td>\n<td>83541<\/td>\n<td>764<\/td>\n<td>0.9%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>8<\/td>\n<td>83559<\/td>\n<td>357<\/td>\n<td>0.4%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>9<\/td>\n<td>86684<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>10<\/td>\n<td>83014<\/td>\n<td>1388<\/td>\n<td>1.7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>11<\/td>\n<td>86381<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>12<\/td>\n<td>84745<\/td>\n<td>3229<\/td>\n<td>3.8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>13<\/td>\n<td>83500<\/td>\n<td>424<\/td>\n<td>0.5%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>14<\/td>\n<td>88470<\/td>\n<td>237<\/td>\n<td>0.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>15<\/td>\n<td>91212<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>16<\/td>\n<td>85097<\/td>\n<td>742<\/td>\n<td>0.9%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>17<\/td>\n<td>90514<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>18<\/td>\n<td>89413<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>19<\/td>\n<td>91288<\/td>\n<td>241<\/td>\n<td>0.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>20<\/td>\n<td>91180<\/td>\n<td>597<\/td>\n<td>0.7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>21<\/td>\n<td>87764<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>22<\/td>\n<td>88642<\/td>\n<td>694<\/td>\n<td>0.8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>23<\/td>\n<td>88865<\/td>\n<td>1491<\/td>\n<td>1.7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>24<\/td>\n<td>83322<\/td>\n<td>154<\/td>\n<td>0.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>25<\/td>\n<td>90432<\/td>\n<td>770<\/td>\n<td>0.9%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>26<\/td>\n<td>89947<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>27<\/td>\n<td>84735<\/td>\n<td>1658<\/td>\n<td>2.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>28<\/td>\n<td>85389<\/td>\n<td>865<\/td>\n<td>1.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>29<\/td>\n<td>90900<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>30<\/td>\n<td>91038<\/td>\n<td>14<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>31<\/td>\n<td>91241<\/td>\n<td>277<\/td>\n<td>0.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>32<\/td>\n<td>88602<\/td>\n<td>3235<\/td>\n<td>3.7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>33<\/td>\n<td>85001<\/td>\n<td>17<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>34<\/td>\n<td>89807<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>35<\/td>\n<td>83094<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>36<\/td>\n<td>86038<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>37<\/td>\n<td>90307<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>38<\/td>\n<td>86444<\/td>\n<td>3190<\/td>\n<td>3.7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>39<\/td>\n<td>85371<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>40<\/td>\n<td>86359<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>41<\/td>\n<td>89876<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>42<\/td>\n<td>82965<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>43<\/td>\n<td>85335<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>44<\/td>\n<td>82683<\/td>\n<td>535<\/td>\n<td>0.6%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>45<\/td>\n<td>83745<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>46<\/td>\n<td>83701<\/td>\n<td>2187<\/td>\n<td>2.6%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>47<\/td>\n<td>83452<\/td>\n<td>1060<\/td>\n<td>1.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>48<\/td>\n<td>86256<\/td>\n<td>2755<\/td>\n<td>3.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>49<\/td>\n<td>84251<\/td>\n<td>825<\/td>\n<td>1.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>50<\/td>\n<td>86290<\/td>\n<td>1539<\/td>\n<td>1.8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>51<\/td>\n<td>83073<\/td>\n<td>416<\/td>\n<td>0.5%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>52<\/td>\n<td>84383<\/td>\n<td>716<\/td>\n<td>0.8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>53<\/td>\n<td>83312<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>54<\/td>\n<td>83475<\/td>\n<td>66<\/td>\n<td>0.1%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>55<\/td>\n<td>82927<\/td>\n<td>1598<\/td>\n<td>1.9%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>56<\/td>\n<td>85142<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>57<\/td>\n<td>90259<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>58<\/td>\n<td>90051<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>59<\/td>\n<td>90829<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>60<\/td>\n<td>90340<\/td>\n<td>238<\/td>\n<td>0.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>61<\/td>\n<td>90183<\/td>\n<td>654<\/td>\n<td>0.7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>62<\/td>\n<td>89637<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>63<\/td>\n<td>83847<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>64<\/td>\n<td>87568<\/td>\n<td>397<\/td>\n<td>0.5%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>65<\/td>\n<td>91096<\/td>\n<td>173<\/td>\n<td>0.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>66<\/td>\n<td>88717<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>67<\/td>\n<td>88255<\/td>\n<td>1329<\/td>\n<td>1.5%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>68<\/td>\n<td>88209<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>69<\/td>\n<td>89186<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>70<\/td>\n<td>89118<\/td>\n<td>448<\/td>\n<td>0.5%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>71<\/td>\n<td>88823<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>72<\/td>\n<td>84444<\/td>\n<td>913<\/td>\n<td>1.1%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>73<\/td>\n<td>90036<\/td>\n<td>555<\/td>\n<td>0.6%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>74<\/td>\n<td>83545<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>75<\/td>\n<td>87378<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>76<\/td>\n<td>89815<\/td>\n<td>1174<\/td>\n<td>1.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>77<\/td>\n<td>90628<\/td>\n<td>136<\/td>\n<td>0.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>78<\/td>\n<td>86365<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>79<\/td>\n<td>84681<\/td>\n<td>1219<\/td>\n<td>1.4%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>80<\/td>\n<td>83289<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>81<\/td>\n<td>85641<\/td>\n<td>647<\/td>\n<td>0.8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>82<\/td>\n<td>91227<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>83<\/td>\n<td>90899<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>84<\/td>\n<td>86773<\/td>\n<td>324<\/td>\n<td>0.4%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>85<\/td>\n<td>90770<\/td>\n<td>2791<\/td>\n<td>3.1%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>86<\/td>\n<td>87570<\/td>\n<td>1145<\/td>\n<td>1.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>87<\/td>\n<td>85009<\/td>\n<td>413<\/td>\n<td>0.5%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>88<\/td>\n<td>84505<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>89<\/td>\n<td>85577<\/td>\n<td>443<\/td>\n<td>0.5%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>90<\/td>\n<td>88208<\/td>\n<td>150<\/td>\n<td>0.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>91<\/td>\n<td>82920<\/td>\n<td>103<\/td>\n<td>0.1%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>92<\/td>\n<td>87079<\/td>\n<td>10<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>93<\/td>\n<td>87194<\/td>\n<td>225<\/td>\n<td>0.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>94<\/td>\n<td>85564<\/td>\n<td>1690<\/td>\n<td>2.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>95<\/td>\n<td>85366<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>96<\/td>\n<td>89587<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>97<\/td>\n<td>86810<\/td>\n<td>218<\/td>\n<td>0.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>98<\/td>\n<td>82789<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>99<\/td>\n<td>84406<\/td>\n<td>30<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>100<\/td>\n<td>86763<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>101<\/td>\n<td>84368<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>102<\/td>\n<td>84206<\/td>\n<td>90<\/td>\n<td>0.1%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>103<\/td>\n<td>89354<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>104<\/td>\n<td>83554<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>105<\/td>\n<td>85671<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>106<\/td>\n<td>86716<\/td>\n<td>1454<\/td>\n<td>1.7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>107<\/td>\n<td>88854<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>108<\/td>\n<td>89468<\/td>\n<td>686<\/td>\n<td>0.8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>109<\/td>\n<td>88881<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>110<\/td>\n<td>89459<\/td>\n<td>255<\/td>\n<td>0.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>111<\/td>\n<td>84508<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>112<\/td>\n<td>87217<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<td>0.0%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>113<\/td>\n<td>89151<\/td>\n<td>510<\/td>\n<td>0.6%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>114<\/td>\n<td>91120<\/td>\n<td>365<\/td>\n<td>0.4%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>115<\/td>\n<td>88875<\/td>\n<td>656<\/td>\n<td>0.7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>116<\/td>\n<td>89457<\/td>\n<td>369<\/td>\n<td>0.4%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>117<\/td>\n<td>91035<\/td>\n<td>155<\/td>\n<td>0.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>118<\/td>\n<td>83282<\/td>\n<td>86<\/td>\n<td>0.1%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>119<\/td>\n<td>90212<\/td>\n<td>125<\/td>\n<td>0.1%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>120<\/td>\n<td>84907<\/td>\n<td>218<\/td>\n<td>0.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<div class=\"methodology\">\n<h2>Table notes<\/h2>\n<dl data-desc-of=\"ncdistricts\">\n<dt>Total Population<\/dt>\n<dd>Total population reported for all blocks in the district (as redrawn in 2023). Block populations <a href=\"https:\/\/www.census.gov\/programs-surveys\/decennial-census\/about\/rdo\/summary-files.html#P1\">reported for the 2020 Census in the PL 94-171 redistricting summary files Table P1<\/a>.<\/dd>\n<dt>Incarcerated Population<\/dt>\n<dd>Total incarcerated population reported in all blocks in the district (as redrawn in 2023), based on the incarcerated population in group quarters <a href=\"https:\/\/www.census.gov\/programs-surveys\/decennial-census\/about\/rdo\/summary-files.html#P1\">reported for the 2020 Census in the PL 94-171 redistricting summary files Table P5<\/a>.<\/dd>\n<dt>Percent of the District that is Incarcerated<\/dt>\n<dd>This is the number of incarcerated people counted in the district divided by the total Census population of the district.<\/dd>\n<\/dl>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"read-more\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"button btn\">See the full appendix<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<h2>About the Data<\/h2>\n<p>\n<b>Correctional Facility Populations:<\/b> To calculate the percentage of each district&#8217;s population that was in correctional facilities, we used the redistricting data (PL 94-171) from the 2020 Census. Table P1 provides the total population for each Census block and Table P5 provides the number of incarcerated people for each Census Block.  Notably, this approach includes people in all kinds of correctional facilities, including state prisons, federal prisons, private prisons, local jails, halfway houses, etc.\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<b>Identifying specific facilities:<\/b> Table P5 provides the population of correctional facilities without distinguishing between state, federal, or private facilities and it is published for each Census block. Census blocks do not necessarily translate directly to facilities, as some facilities are counted in multiple blocks and some blocks contain multiple facilities. To aid redistricting officials and advocates with using this data, the Prison Policy Initiative maintains a <a href=\"\/locator2020\/\">Facility Locator Tool<\/a> that contains annotations of most of the Census blocks in the country that contain correctional facilities. These annotations rely on publicly-available data to identify facility names and types in each of these blocks.\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<b>Calculating how many North Carolina residents are held by the Bureau of Prisons:<\/b><br \/>\nOur calculations on the number of people in federal prisons in each state are based on data provided by the Bureau of Prisons in response to our periodic Freedom of Information Act requests. We&#8217;ve archived their response from 2020 at: <a href=\"\/\/static.prisonpolicy.org\/scans\/2020-bop-origin.pdf\">https:\/\/www.prisonpolicy.org\/scans\/2020-bop-origin.pdf<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<b>How this report quantifies prison gerrymandering compared to other analyses:<\/b> There are a few ways to calculate the impact of prison gerrymandering, so other researchers may have used slightly different approaches that generate slightly different numbers for the same general problem. For example, some analyses only focus on prisons and exclude jail populations. That choice makes sense when looking at state-level policies and state districts because people in jails are very likely to also live in the legislative district where the jail is located. However, for this analysis we included jails as well as state correctional facilities because Oklahoma regularly rents space in local jails to hold a significant number of people for state authorities. Still other approaches, such as that taken by the <a href=\"https:\/\/redistrictingdatahub.org\/reports\/prison-gerrymandering-and-reform-efforts\/\">Redistricting Data Hub<\/a>, are based on estimates of incarcerated people&#8217;s home addresses. That approach adds an additional level of precision for counting people held in state facilities because it seeks to not only address where these people were counted incorrectly &mdash; which accounts for the bulk of prison gerrymandering&#8217;s population distortion, &mdash; but to also estimate where they should have been counted. Unfortunately, this approach isn&#8217;t able to reflect where people in federal facilities, and most jails and private facilities are from. And so for simplicity this report doesn&#8217;t use that approach.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nEach of these approaches have their own merits, and none are universally better than others; they all highlight different aspects of how prison gerrymandering skews population numbers, and each have their own use. This complex weave of data also points to the need for the Census Bureau to count incarcerated people at home in the first place in order to provide a comprehensive solution to prison gerrymandering.\n<\/p>\n<p id=\"analysis\">\n<b>Analysis of rural impact:<\/b> We followed the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ncruralcenter.org\/county-data\/\">NC Rural Center&#8217;s determinations<\/a> in identifying rural counties. And we used the <a href=\"https:\/\/webapps.doc.state.nc.us\/apps\/asqExt\/ASQ\">ASQ (Automated System Query) tool<\/a>, available through the Administrative Analysis Section of the NC Department of Adult Correction to determine the home counties of incarcerated people.\n<\/p>\n<div id=\"footnotes\" class=\"footnotes\">\n<h2>Footnotes<\/h2>\n<ol>\n<li class=\"footnote\" id=\"fn:1\">\n<p>N.C. Gen. Stat. S 163-57(2) and (3)<a href=\"#fnref:1\" title=\"return to article\"> &#160;&#8617;<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li class=\"footnote\" id=\"fn:2\">\n<p>In our research conducted into the previous (2010) round of redistricting, <a href=\"\/problem\/local.html\">we discovered notable prison gerrymandering in an additional 15 counties, cities, and school boards<\/a> but where we did not have the resources to update our research for the 2020 round of redistricting: Anson County, Anson County Schools, Caswell County Schools, Clinton city, Edgecombe County, Franklin County, Franklin County Schools, Goldsboro city, Granville County Schools, Halifax County, Lumberton city, Pamlico County, Pamlico County Schools, Pasquotank County, and Robeson County.<\/p>\n<p>While we do not know for sure if these local governments continue to engage in prison gerrymandering, we hope that this list will be a good starting point for other advocates or researchers who wish to look for additional examples of local governments in North Carolina that continue to engage in prison gerrymandering or that have decided they no longer wish to engage in the practice.<a href=\"#fnref:2\" title=\"return to article\"> &#160;&#8617;<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li class=\"footnote\" id=\"fn:3\">\n<p>Nationwide <a href=\"\/local\/\">we identified hundreds of governments<\/a> that avoided prison gerrymandering after the 2000 and 2010 Censuses (decades when zero and two, respectively, states adjusted their redistricting data to count people at home). This decade we limited the scope of our research but still found an <a href=\"\/news\/2024\/07\/30\/local-2020\/\">additional 21 local governments scattered across 10 states<\/a> that started doing so after the 2020 Census despite those states continuing to use unadjusted data for state-level districts. North Carolina is one of those states; Granville County avoided prison gerrymandering for the first time in the 2020 redistricting cycle.<a href=\"#fnref:3\" title=\"return to article\"> &#160;&#8617;<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>North Carolina\u2019s redistricting data was once again skewed after the 2020 Census; the state needs to take action to fix the issue for 2030.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[11,76,13,12],"coauthors":[30],"class_list":["post-10623","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-gerrymandering","tag-north-carolina","tag-prisons","tag-redistricting"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10623","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10623"}],"version-history":[{"count":11,"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10623\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10871,"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10623\/revisions\/10871"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10623"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10623"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10623"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.prisonersofthecensus.org\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=10623"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}